Group bargaining with representation by Chae, Suchan
Group Bargaining with 
Representation1
Suchan Chae*
We study a strategic bargaining model where two groups of 
individuals first choose their representatives, who then bargain 
with each other using a standard alternating-offer protocol, and 
then the shares of the members of a group are determined by a 
similar n-person bargaining process within the group. We show 
that there exists a unique perfect equilibrium outcome of this 
three-stage game when the breakdown probabilities of both the 
inter-group bargaining and intra-group bargaining are small. In 
equilibrium, each group selects as its representative an individual 
who has the greatest marginal gain from increasing the group’s 
share.
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I. Introduction
When groups of individuals bargain with each other, actual 
bargaining is typically carried out by their representatives. The 
literature on delegated bargaining studies how the relationship between 
the members of a group and its representative affects the outcome of 
the bargaining. In some models, the agreement reached by a represen- 
tative should be approved by the members of the group. Perry and 
Samuelson (1994), Haller and Holden (1997), and Manzini and Mariotti 
(2005) investigate the effect of alternative approval processes on the 
outcome of bargaining. In some other models, representatives are 
elected. Segendorff (1998) and Cai (2000) study the effect of this election 
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on the bargaining outcome. 
In this paper, we consider a strategic model of bargaining with 
three-stages: At stage 1, two groups choose their representatives. At 
stage 2, to be called the inter-group bargaining, the representatives of 
the two groups, chosen at stage 1, bargain over the split of a pie 
between the two groups. At stage 3, to be called the intra-group 
bargaining, the members of each group bargain over the division of the 
group’s share, which was determined at stage 2, among the members. 
Examples of bargaining situations where both inter-group and 
intra-group bargaining are present abound. To take a few examples, 
labor unions bargain over wages with management which represents 
shareholders; bankers and bondholders bargain over the assets of 
bankrupt companies; two neighborhoods bargain over public projects 
that affect them both. 
For both the inter-group bargaining and intra-group bargaining, we 
use a Rubinstein-type (1982) alternating-offer protocol, where a rejection 
leads to a breakdown of bargaining with a positive probability. The 
main contribution of the paper is to show that despite complex feed- 
backs between the inter-group and intra-group bargaining, there exists 
a unique perfect equilibrium outcome of the game when the breakdown 
probabilities are small. Also, for a series of examples, we characterize 
the solutions in the limit as the breakdown probabilities become 
negligible. 
We also demonstrate that an individual with the greatest marginal 
gain will be the best candidate to become a representative. The reason 
is that a group’s share is larger if the marginal gain of the represen- 
tative from the group’s share is larger. Such an individual will be 
actually chosen by the group in equilibrium if representatives are 
selected at the start of the inter-group bargaining, for there is no 
internal conflict among the members of a group regarding this choice. 
The result on representation can be interpreted in two ways. First, 
one may say that an individual who has the most at stake should 
become the representative. Second, one may say that the player who is 
the toughest bargainer should become the representative. In the 
current setting, the two criteria actually coincide. The reason is that 
the toughest individual gets the most in the intra-group bargaining   
as well as in the inter-group bargaining. In general, the “toughest 
bargainer” cannot be defined in absolute terms, but only relative to his 
opponent in the two-person bargaining. But there are cases where an 
individual is uniformly “tougher” than the other members of her group 
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at any level of the share and thus will be chosen as the group’s 
representative, regardless of who represents the other group. 
Note that once the inter-group bargaining determines the group 
shares, the intra-group bargaining that follows is a standard n-person 
bargaining problem. There are many different models extending 
Rubinstein’s two-person alternating-offer model to the n-person case. It 
is well known that some of these n-person models lead to multiple 
equilibria.1 Thus, in order to have a unique perfect equilibrium for the 
n-person case, we use the protocol used in Chae and Yang (1994).
The current paper adopts a strategic approach in investigating group 
bargaining. In an axiomatic approach, Chae and Heidhues (2004) 
characterize a group bargaining solution using axioms that include the 
four standard Nash (1950) axioms (efficiency, independence, invariance 
with respect to affine transformation, symmetry). They add a new 
axiom that essentially treats a group as one bargainer.2 In their 
solution, the group’s preferences reflect the average preferences of the 
members of the group, due to, among other things, symmetry. In 
contrast, in the strategic model of the current paper, the group’s 
implied preferences are determined by those of the best bargainer in 
the group.
II. Model and Results
We will first describe the stage-one game: Two non-overlapping 
groups of finite individuals bargain over the split of a pie. Group 1 and 
group 2 will be denoted G1 and G2. First, each group simultaneously 
selects one of its members as a representative. Here one may assume 
for simplicity that an arbitrary member of each group has the privilege 
of selecting the representative for the group. It turns out that in 
equilibrium the same representative will be chosen no matter who 
selects the representative, for it is in the interest of any member of the 
group to choose a representative that will maximize the group’s pie. 
Next, in the stage-two game, the two representatives bargain with 
each other over the split of the pie (X1, X2), where X1＋X2＝π , in a 
standard Rubinstein-type (1982) two-person alternating offer procedure 
1 See, for instance, Herrero (1985), Haller (1986), and Shaked’s example in 
Sutton (1986).
2 Chae and Moulin (forthcoming) generalizes the solution to a family of 
solutions with alternative axioms.
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with a fixed probability of breakdown after each rejection. If the 
bargaining breaks down, the game ends and each individual receives 
its breakdown payoff di. We assume that ∑i∈G1∪G2 di＜π . The break- 
down probability is denoted 1－p. 
Finally, we describe the stage-three game: Once the two representa- 
tives reach an agreement (X1, X2), each group Gg( g＝1, 2) immediately 
bargains over the split of Xg among its ng members in a Chae-Yang- 
type (1994) n-person alternating-offer procedure with a fixed probability 
of breakdown after each rejection. The breakdown probability is 
denoted 1－q. If the bargaining breaks down, the game ends and each 
individual receives its breakdown payoff di as before. 
The intra-group bargaining game can be described as follows: First, 
one individual is chosen to be the initial proposer. Assume, for 
simplicity, that the representative of the group in the inter-group 
bargaining is the initial proposer in the intra-group bargaining.3 She 
selects one responder and proposes that they sign a contingent 
contract stipulating that she pay him a certain share of the pie at the 
end of the bargaining process. If he accepts her proposal, he gives up 
his right to talk and waits on the sidelines until the end of the game, 
and she continues to be a proposer in the remaining game with n－1 
active individuals who have the common knowledge of the contract. If 
he rejects her proposal, he becomes the initial proposer in a similar 
n-person game. The rules of the game in a subgame with n－m active 
individuals who have common knowledge about m contracts are 
similar. The game ends in agreement if all individuals except one have 
given up their rights to talk. At this point, all contracts are executed 
and the individual who has not given up her right to talk keeps the 
residual share. (If any individual defaults on his or her debt, no 
individual receives any payment.) 
Denote the von-Neumann Morgenstern (vN-M) utility function of an 
individual by ui. We assume that ui is smooth (that is, differentiable as 




) log(ui(xi )－ui(di ))＜0 for any xi＞di≥0.
The assumption implies that the log of utility gain is strictly concave. 
3 It can be shown that the results of the paper do not depend on this 
simplifying assumption.
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It is satisfied if ui’’≤0. That is, it is satisfied by all risk-averse or 
risk-neutral preferences. But it is also satisfied by some risk-loving 
preferences. For instance, it is satisfied by all preferences that can be 
represented by vN-M utility functions with constant relative risk 
aversion, ui(x)＝x
1－r, where r＜0.4
Given a payoff xi, a breakdown payoff di, and breakdown probability 
1－p, define an individual’s certainty equivalent ci(p, xi ) as the payoff y 
such that pui(xi )＋(1－p)ui (di )＝ui(y).5 The amount an individual is 
willing to pay in order to avoid an infinitesimal chance of breakdown 
will be called the marginal risk concession (MRC). It is formally defined 
and denoted as
μ i (xi )≡ lim
p→1




ci (1, xi )＝






log (ui(xi )－ui (di ))＝
ui’(xi )
＝
ui (xi )－ui (di )
1
μ i (xi )
and thus Assumption 1 can be rewritten as 
μ i’(xi )＞0 for any xi＞di,                      (1)
for the derivative of (d/dxi )log (ui(xi )－ui(di )) is negative if and only if 
the derivative of μ i(xi ) is positive. 
We will solve the bargaining game backward starting from stage 3, 
that is, from the intra-group bargaining between the members of group 
g(＝1,2) over the division of given Xg. We will assume that Xg＞∑i∈Gg di, 
for this will be the case in equilibrium. In the Appendix, we will prove6
4
See Chae and Heidhues (1999).
5 Throughout the paper the breakdown payoffs will be fixed. Thus we will not 
explicitly recognize them in our notation unless necessary. For instance, ci (p, xi ) 
would have been written as ci (p, xi, di ) if di were a variable in the course of our 
investigation. Similarly, μ i(xi ) stands for μ i(xi , di ).
6
We prove the proposition by modifying the proof of a similar result in Chae 
and Yang (1994), where they study an n-person bargaining model in which the 
rejection of an offer leads to a time delay rather than the risk of a breakdown.
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Proposition 1.
Consider a subgame where group Gg(g＝1, 2) bargains over the split 
of Xg (＞∑i∈Gg di ) among its ng members after the representatives of the 
two groups have reached an agreement (X1, X2). 
( i ) There exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of 
the subgame. 
( ii ) An individual’s payoff in the equilibrium outcome increases as 
the pie, Xg, available for the group increases. 
(iii) As the breakdown probability, 1－q, goes to zero, the equilibrium 
outcome approaches the Nash bargaining solution. 
　　
The Nash bargaining solution, to which the unique perfect equilibrium 
outcome of the subgame of the above proposition converges, solves the 
maximization problem
Maximize  Π {ui (xi )－ui (di )}
 i∈Gg
Subject to ( ∑ xi≤Xgi∈Gg
xi≥di






μ i (xi )＝μ h(xh ) for any i, h∈Gg,                   (2)
which is the condition for balancing bargaining power.
Denote the share of individual i at the Nash bargaining solution as 
xi＝φ i(Xg ) and set 
Ui(Xg )≡ui(φ i(Xg)).
We will assume that 
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Assumption 2.
Ui(Xg ) also satisfies the strict log-concavity condition in Assumption 1, 
i.e., (d2/d Xg
2) log(ui(φ i(Xg ))－ui(di ))＜0 for any Xg＞∑i∈Ggdi≥0.






d Xg φ i’(Xg)
                        (3)
A sufficient condition for (3) is 
φ i’’ (Xg)≤0 for any Xg. 
For instance, if an individual’s preferences exhibit constant absolute 
risk aversion, φ i’’ (Xg )＝0 for any Xg＞∑i∈Ggdi and thus (3) is satisfied. 
By (2), one has 
μi(φ i (Xg))＝μh (φh(Xg )) for any i, h∈Gg.            (4)
Thus one can define, for g＝1, 2,
μ g(Xg)≡μ i(φ i(Xg)) for some (and all) i∈Gg,
and call it the MRC for group g.
Using the intra-group result of Proposition 1, we can now analyze 
the inter-group bargaining game. We will prove in the Appendix
Theorem 1.
Consider a subgame where individuals j and k have been chosen as 
the representatives of groups G1 and G2, respectively. 
(i) There exist p̂, q̂∈(0, 1) such that for any p＞p̂, q＞q̂ there exists a 
unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game.  
(ii) In the limit where the breakdown probabilities (1－p and 1－q ) 
approach zero, the equilibrium outcome (X1, X2) of the inter-group 
bargaining game satisfies the efficiency condition X1＋X2＝π and 






                       (5)
The theorem constitutes a new and significant result in that it shows 
that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome 
despite complex feedbacks between the intra-group bargaining and 
inter-group bargaining. But, unlike the standard results in the 
alternating-offer models of one-stage bargaining, the result holds only 
when the breakdown probabilities are small. Intuitively, as the 
breakdown probabilities become small, the model behaves like the 
limiting model, which yields the outcome described in (ii) of the above 
theorem. 
Now consider the representation game where the two groups choose 
their representatives. By (ii) of Proposition 1, there is no intra-group 
conflict in choosing a group’s representative. Every member of the 
group benefits from “the best bargainer” representing the group. We 
will prove in the Appendix
Theorem 2.
Consider the entire three-stage game. 
( i ) There exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of 
the game if the breakdown probabilities (1－p, 1－q) of both the 
intra-group bargaining and inter-group bargaining are sufficiently 
close to zero. 
(ii) In equilibrium, the representative of a group is a member that 
has the greatest marginal gain from increasing the group’s share. 
　　
In order to get an intuition for the above theorem, consider the 
representation game in the limit. Because (5) holds in equilibrium, it 
will be in the interest of a group to choose as its representative an 
individual with the greatest marginal gain, φ i’ (Xg ), from increasing the 
group’s share. “The best bargainer” for a group is one who has the 
most at stake. 
For a formal description of the solution in the limit, define, for g＝1, 2, 
ϕ g (Yg )≡Maxi∈gφ i’(Yg). Then the function ϕ g is continuous and          
μ g(Yg )/ϕ g(Yg) is increasing in Yg (≥∑i∈Ggdi ). Thus there exists a unique 






                       (6)
Once X1 and X2(≡π－X1) are determined, the shares of individuals 
are determined as
xi＝φ i (Xg ) for i∈Gg.
This constitutes the unique equilibrium outcome of the game in the 
limit. The representatives chosen in equilibrium can be identified as 
individuals j and k such that ϕ1(X1)＝φ j’(X1), ϕ 2(π－X1)＝φk’ (π－X1), i.e.,
 
φ j’ (X1)≥φh’ (X1) for any h∈G1, 
φk’ (π－X1)≥φ l’ (π－X1) for any l∈G2. 
Note that in general the best bargainer for a group depends on who 
represents the other group. In the special case where an individual is 
uniformly “tougher” than the other individuals in her group at any level 
of the share, the toughest player will be chosen regardless of who 
represents the other group. 
Example 1.
Suppose that an individual’s preferences can be represented by vN-M 
utility functions with constant relative risk aversion, i.e., ui(x)＝x
α i  
where 0＜α i and that di＝0. (Notice here that if α＞1 then individual i 
is actually risk loving.) Then
 μi (xi )＝
xi
α i , 
 φ i(Xg )＝
α i Xg
∑h∈Ggα h , 
 φ i’(Xg)＝
α i
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 ϕ g (Xg)＝
α g
∑h∈Ggαh , 























π  if i belongs to group g.
Example 2.
Suppose there are n＋1 individuals with the same preferences and 
the same breakdown point, d. They are partitioned into two groups, 
one with n members and the other with a single member, individual 
n＋1. In the multi-member group, denoted simply G, one arbitrary 
member, individual j, becomes the group’s representative. Define μ id(zi )




)＝μ dn＋1(π－(n＋1)d－ZG ), 
Looking at the left hand side of this equation, note that a homo- 
geneous group being represented by one member does not get the 
same deal as what the member would get if she were the only member. 
In other words, XG can be greater or smaller than π/2 (or equivalently, 
ZG can be greater or smaller than {π－(n＋1)d }/2). Whether a multi- 
member homogeneous group does better or worse than a single-member 
group depends on whether μ jd(zi/n)＜μ id(zi )/n or μ id(zi/n)＞μ id (zi )/n. 
Thus, if the function μ id(zi ) is convex in zi , the group does better, while 
if the function is concave in zi , the individual does better.7 The 
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borderline case is the case of vN-M utilities with constant relative risk 
aversion and zero breakdown point studied in Example 1. 
Example 3.
Suppose there are two homogeneous groups, each consisting of n 
individuals. Group 1 consists of individuals of the “tough” type, 
denoted t, and group 2 consists of individuals of the “soft” type, 


















).                        (7) 
Compare this with the tough individual’s share X1 when n＝1, which 
satisfies
μ t (X1)＝μs (π－X1).                        (8)
In general, solutions to (7) and (8) are different. When two individuals 
who represent their groups bargain, their perceived pie up for grabs is 
π/n. But when two individuals only represent themselves, they bargain 
over the whole π. In the latter case, they think “big.” In the former 
case, they think “small.” Only in special cases, such as Example 1, 
where the preferences are vN-M utilities with constant relative risk 
aversion and zero breakdown point, (7) and (8) will lead to the same 
solution. 
Example 4.
Consider a special case of Example 3 where n＝2. Compare its 
outcome with that of an alternative situation where there exist two 
identically composed groups. In each group, there are two individuals, 
7 Chae and Heidhues (1999) use the convexity of the marginal risk concession 
function in showing the advantage of forming an alliance.
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one tough type and one soft type. Since each group will select the 
tough type as its representatives, X1＝X2＝π/2, and the intra-group 
bargaining leads to 




which yields the same solution xt as in (7), where Xt/2＝xt. Thus a 
tough individual’s share is the same in the two situations. In the two 
situations, the representatives’ perceived pie for bargaining is at the 
same level, i.e., π/2. 
III. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we studied a strategic model of group bargaining 
where both inter-group bargaining and intra-group bargaining are 
carried out according to well-known alternating-offer procedures. We 
showed that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium 
outcome when the breakdown probabilities are sufficiently small. In our 
model, an arbitrary member of each group chooses a representative for 
the group. We showed that each group will choose as its representative 
an individual whose marginal gain from increasing the group’s share is 
the greatest. 
The model can be applied to a variety of bargaining situations where 
groups such as households, labor unions, firms, and countries bargain 
with each other. Even though we only studied some basic theoretical 
issues in this paper, the future research may yield richer implications 
specific to applications using variations of the model presented here. 
(Received 14 January 2009; Revised 24 March 2009)
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: We will modify the proof of a similar result 
in Chae and Yang (1994). In their model, the rejection of an offer leads 
to a time delay rather than the risk of a breakdown. Steps that are 
obvious from Chae and Yang (1994) will be omitted for simplicity. 
Denote the members of group g simply by 1, …, n. In equilibrium, the 
game ends immediately. The outcome depends on the identity of the 
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initial proposer, for the initial proposer has some advantage. We will 
denote the equilibrium payoff vector in the case where i (＝1, …, n) is 









j ) for any j≠i .
What an individual receives in equilibrium when he is not the initial 
proposer is the certainty equivalent of the consequences of his 
rejection. After his rejection, with probability q he will become the 
initial proposer in the next round, and with probability 1－q the game 
will break down. In particular, individual j ’s payoff when he is not an 









＋c2(q, y2)＋…＋cn (q, yn )＝Xg,
c1(q, y1)＋y2＋…＋cn (q, yn )＝Xg,
…
c1(q, y1)＋c2(q, y2 )＋…＋yn＝Xg.
The premium of an individual i when he is the initiator is yi－ci (q, y). 
From the above system of equations, one has 
y
1
－c1(q, y1)＝…＝yn－cn (q, yn ).                  (A1)
Since yi－cj (q, yi ) is an increasing function of yi (≥di ) by Assumption 1, 




(Xg )  and φ i (Xg )≡limq→1φ i
q
(Xg). Then xi≡φ i (Xg) is i ’s 
share of Xg according to the Nash bargaining solution. In order to see 
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i.e.,
μ1(x1)＝…＝μn (xn ),
which is condition (2).  Q.E.D. 
Proof of Theorem 1: We will only sketch the proof omitting obvious 
steps. Denote the equilibrium payoff vector in the case where group g’s 





) (g＝1, 2). Also, denote the inverse of the function of φ i
q
 by  
ψ i
q
















. Then (Y1, Y2) is the solution to the 







　                 ψ j
q
(cj (p, φ jq (Y1)))＋Y2＝π                  (A2)
From equation system (A2), one has 
Y1－ψ j
q




(Y2))),          (A3)
i.e.,





(ck (p, φk (Y2)))
1－p
. 
Each side  of the above equation is an increasing function of Yg 
(g＝1, 2) if p and q are sufficiently close to 1 as can be seen as 
follows: Denote each side of the above equation by Fi (Yg ), where i＝j, k 
for groups 1 and 2, respectively. Then
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ci (p, φ i
q
(Yg))}
By L’Hospital’s rule, noticing that ψ i





μi {φ i (Yg))φ i’’(Yg)
{φ i’ (Yg)}
2  ,
which is positive for any Yg＞∑i∈Ggdi by Assumption 2. Thus, Fi’ (Yg)＞0 
for p and q sufficiently close to 1. Since Fi’ (Yg ) is continuous in p and 
q, it is uniformly continuous on a compact interval. This statement 
does not depend on Yg, that is, for any small ε＞0, there exist p̂, q̂∈
(0,1) such that for any p＞p ̂, q＞q ̂, and Yg∈[ε＋∑i∈Ggdi, π ], one has 
Fi’ (Yg)＞0. 
Now assume that p＞p̂, q＞q̂,   and denote each side of Equation (A3) 
by fi (Yg). Then fi’ (Yg)＞0. To the extent that either fj (Y1) or fk(Y2) can be 
bounded from above, assume, without loss of generality, that fj (Y1) has 
the smaller least upper bound. (If fj (Y1) is not bounded from above, its 
least upper bound is ∞.) Then the function Y2＝fk
－1∘fj (Y1) is well 







－1∘fj (Y1))))＝π.                 (A4)
The left hand side of this equation increases continuously from 0 to 
infinity as Y1(＞∑i∈G1di ) increases. Thus there exists a unique solution 
Y1 of Equation (A4). 
Now, we will look at the outcome of the inter-group bargaining game 
in the limit. Let ψ i (Xg)≡limq→1ψ i
q
(Xg ). As q goes to 1, Equation (A3) 
can be rewritten in the limit as
Y1－ψ j (cj (p, φ j (Y1)))＝Y2－ψk (ck ( p, φk (Y2))),
Thus
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lim
p→1











cj (1, φ j (Y1))＝ψ k’(φk (Y2 ))․
∂
∂p
ck (1, φk (Y2)),
i.e.,






which is the same as (5). 
　　 
Proof of Theorem 2: For g＝1, 2, define fg (Yg)≡mini∈Gg fi (Yg). Then 
the function fg (Yg) is continuous and increasing in Yg for p sufficiently 
close to 1. (The identity of the best bargainer changes as Yg changes.) 
To the extent that either f1(Y1) or f2 (Y2) can be bounded from above, 
assume, without loss of generality, that f1(Y1 ) has the smaller least 
upper bound. Then the function Y2＝f2
－1




The left hand side of this equation increases continuously from 0 to 
infinity as Y1(＞∑i∈G1di ) increases. Thus there exists a unique solution  
X1 of the above equation when p and q are sufficiently close to 1. Once 
X1 is determined, the shares of individuals are determined as
xh＝φh
q
(X1) for any member h of group 1,
xl＝φ l
q
(π－X1) for any member l of group 2.
This constitutes the unique equilibrium outcome of the representa- 
tion game. The representatives chosen in equilibrium can be identified 
as follows: Let j and k be the members of groups 1 and 2 such that  
f1(X1)＝fj (X1) and f1(π－X1)＝fk (π－X1) (at X1 in equilibrium), i.e.,
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fj (X1)≤fh (X1) for any h∈G1, 
fk(π－X1)≤ fl (π－X1) for any l∈G2. 
Then groups 1 and 2 will choose such individuals j and k as their 
representatives in equilibrium. In order to see this, suppose to the 
contrary that there exists some h∈G1 such that fj (X1)＞fh (X1). Let X͂1 
be the solution to the following equation: 
fh (Y1)＝fk (π－Y1). 
Then since fh (X1)＜ fk(π－X1) and both sides of the above equation are 
monotonic, one has X͂1＞X1. Thus, given that group 2 chooses k as its 
representative, it is not optimal for group 1 to choose j as its re- 
presentative.  Q.E.D. 
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